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Abstract
In this paper we use a dynamic programming approach to analytically solve an endogenous
growth model with internal habits where the key parameters describing their formation,
namely the intensity, persistence and lag structure (or memory), are kept generic. Then we
show that external and internal habits lead to the same closed loop policy function and then
to the same (Pareto) optimal equilibrium path of the aggregate variables when the utility
function is subtractive nonseparable. The paper uses new theoretical results from those
previously developed by the dynamic programming literature applied to optimal control
problems with delay and it extends the existing results on the equivalence between models
with internal and external habits to the case of finite memory.
JEL Classification C6; E1; E2.
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1 Introduction
Motivation and Results – In this paper we consider the simplest endogenous growth model
with linear technology, as in Rebelo [34], and we assume that the representative household’s
utility function depends also on internal habits, whose formation is based on the history (up
to a given fixed lag τ ) of past consumption. The resulting instantaneous utility is
u(c(t), h(t))
while the habit formation is described by the following exponentially smoothed index of the
past consumption rates
h(t) = ε
∫ t
t−τ
c(u)eη(u−t)du ∀t ≥ 0 (1)
with ε ≥ 0, η ≥ 0, and τ ≥ 0 indicating respectively the intensity, persistence and lags
structure (or memory) of the habits. The habit formation equation (1) is general in its
assumptions on the intensity, persistence and lag structure and it embeds all the main
specifications used in the literature; the role of τ is indeed critical in pinning down the
different forms of the habits (e.g. τ = 1 is the continuous time version of the case studied
by Boldrin et al. [12] among others).1 A generic and finite choice of the memory parameter
τ is also consistent with recent empirical evidences.2
Our objective is to solve analytically this problem with internal habits using a dynamic pro-
gramming approach and to prove that, independently on the choice of the habits formation’s
parameters, the solution of this problem coincides with the solution of the same problem
but with external habits when the instantaneous utility function has the nonseparable sub-
tractive form:3
u(c(t), h(t)) =
(c(t)− h(t))1−γ
1− γ
γ > 0, γ 6= 1. (2)
1Equation (1) does not include the case with deep habits studied by Raven et al. [33] since we focus on
a single consumption good economy.
2Among them, Crawford [21] uses a revealed preference approach to characterize the internal habits. He
finds no sharp result on the lag structure: increasing the number of period lags in the consumption of the
good increases the “agreement between theory and data. However it (...) has a large negative effect on the
power of the test compared with the one-lag version”. In his contribution, he looks at the cases τ = 1, 2 and
3.
3This instantaneous utility function is, together with the multiplicative nonseparable, one of the two most
common specifications used in the habit formation literature.
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To arrive to this result we prove that, keeping all the else equal, the problem with internal
habits leads to the same solution path of its counterpart with external habits; in the latter
the instantaneous utility function has the same functional form but the habits are now
formed over the past average economy-wide consumption, c¯(·):
h(t) = ε
∫ t
t−τ
c¯(u)eη(u−t)du ∀t ≥ 0;
Our contribution is relevant for the following two main reasons. Firstly, it provides a full
analytical characterization of an endogenous growth model with internal habits and finite
memory. To achieve this result we have extended the dynamic programming approach
to optimal control of Delay Differential Equations (DDE) first developed in Fabbri and
Gozzi [23] to a different framework. In fact, the presence of the habit formation with a
potentially finite lag parameter, τ , implies a substantial analytical deviation from other
problems studied in the literature since here the delay is contained in the objective function.
Therefore, an extension of the previous results on dynamic programming approach to optimal
control of DDE’s is necessary to find explicitly the policy function of our problem: in this
extent, our paper represents a new contribution to the dynamic programming literature
in infinite dimension, as it will be extensively explained later in this introduction and in
Section 3. Secondly, it extends the existing results on consumption externalities not leading
to economic distortions. More precisely, we prove that the equivalence holds when the three
key parameters ε, η, and τ in the habit formation equation are kept generic, while in previous
contributions were assumed either ε = η and τ = 1 (e.g. Alonso-Carrera et al. [3]) or ε = η
and τ =∞ (e.g. Gomez [31]).
Methodology – To prove our results we use a dynamic programming approach to find the
solution of the model with internal habits, then we compare it with the solution in the case
with external habits and finally we show that the two resulting closed loop policy functions
are identical when the utility function has the nonseparable subtractive form.
The model with external habits was solved in Augeraud-Veron and Bambi [4] using a mod-
ified version of the Pontryagin Maximum Principle (PMP) (see e.g. [1]); the closed loop
policy function was also found from the explicit computation of capital, consumption and
habits. Such PMP approach has been recently used by several authors to solve vintage
capital models (e.g. Barucci and Gozzi [8], [9], Boucekkine et al. [15], [16], [17], Bre´chet
et al. [18] Feichtinger et al [27], [28], Saglam and Veliov [35] Veliov [36]) and time to build
models (e.g. Bambi [5] and Bambi and Gori [6]).
The same strategy can be applied to the case with internal habits but it won’t lead to
an explicit formulation of the optimal policy because of the mixed type equation resulting
from the PMP in presence of retarded control. So we proceed to solve the problem with
internal habits and we find the closed loop policy function through the dynamic programming
method; this approach successfully leads to identify the explicit form of the closed loop
policy function as soon as its associated Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (HJB) can be
solved explicitly. It must be noted that the delayed structure of the problem pins down an
HJB equation which is a partial differential equation in infinite dimension without explicit
solutions unless specific assumptions on the production and utility function are introduced.
Luckily enough, the linear production function and the nonseparable subtractive form of
the utility function let us develop an ad hoc approach in order to calculate explicitly the
solutions of the HJB equation and then the closed loop policy functions which, as explained
before, are crucial to prove the equivalence between the internal and external habit formation
model.
The dynamic programming approach to optimal control problems with delay has found very
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few applications in the economic literature. As far as we know the first to apply this method
were Fabbri and Gozzi [23] in a vintage capital framework, and later Boucekkine et al. [13]
and Bambi et al. [7], the latter in a time-to-build model (see also [6], [24] [25] and [26] for
application of the same technique to models with age structure). More recently Boucekkine
et al. [14] used it to investigate the compatibility of the optimal population size concepts
produced by different social welfare functions and egalitarianism. We must note that, from
a technical point of view, the problem we face in this paper is quite different from those in
the papers just quoted because the delayed control appears both in the objective functional
and in the constraints: then we have to extend the theoretical results, already used in the
previously cited papers, to a different context, see on this Remark 19.
Plan of the paper – The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the general model
with habit formation where subsection 2.1 is devoted to further explain the case with internal
habits. Section 3 explains how the problem can be rewritten in infinite dimension and how
to arrive to the solution path using the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. Section 4 states
and proves the equivalence result. Finally Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The model
Consider a standard neoclassical growth model, where the economy consists of a continuum
of identical infinitely lived atomistic households, and firms. The households’ objective is to
maximize over time the discounted instantaneous utility (here c(t) and h(t) are, respectively,
the consumption and the habit at time t):
u(c(t), h(t)) =
(c(t)− h(t))1−γ
1− γ
, (3)
for c(t) ≥ h(t) and γ > 0 γ 6= 14. If c(t) < h(t) the utility function is not always well
defined in the real field and it is never concave. For this reason, it is generally assumed that
u(c(t), h(t)) = −∞ as soon as c(t) < h(t). The instantaneous utility function (3) clearly
implies addiction in the habits since current consumption is forced to remain higher than
the habits over time. The habits are formed according to the rule
h(t) = ε
∫ t
t−τ
cˆ(u)eη(u−t)du ∀t ≥ 0 (4)
where cˆ(t) indicates the customary consumption level, which is equal to c(t) in the case of
internal habits or to the economy-wide average consumption, c¯(t), when we consider external
habits. Moreover η > 0 measures the persistence of habits, while ε > 0 the intensity of habits,
i.e. the importance of the economy average consumption relative to current consumption.
Finally the habits’ past history, h(t) with t ∈ [−τ, 0) is given; also, in the case of external
habits, the path of c¯(t) is taken as given since no individual decision have an appreciable
effect on the average consumption of the economy.
Differentiating (4) (this is possible e.g. in all continuity points of cˆ(·)) we have
h˙(t) = ε
(
cˆ(t)− cˆ(t− τ )e−ητ
)
− ηh(t) ∀t ≥ 0 (5)
Assuming a linear technology y(t) = Ak(t) and a depreciation factor δ > 0 the optimal
4The case γ = 1 can be treated exactly as the other ones. We do not do it here to make the analytical
part less cumbersome.
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control problem to be solved is
max
∫ ∞
0
(
c(t)− ε
∫ t
t−τ
cˆ(u)eη(u−t)du
)1−γ
1− γ
e−ρtdt
s.t. k˙(t) = (A− δ) k(t)− c(t)
k(t) ≥ 0, c(t) ≥ 0, c(t) ≥ ε
∫ t
t−τ
cˆ(u)eη(u−t)du
k(0) = k0 > 0, cˆ(u) given for u ∈ [−τ , 0).
Observe that our framework describes implicitly an economy where new capital is financed
by a riskless technology whose instantaneous rate of return is A− δ. It is also worth noting
that in the case cˆ(t) = c¯(t) the habits enters as an externality in the utility function. On
the other hand, when cˆ(t) = c(t) the habits are formed over the representative agent’s past
consumption level and then are internalized in her resource allocation decision. Observe
also that in the last case the social welfare theorems guarantee that the solution is Pareto
optimal while in the former the presence of the externality could lead to an inefficient path.
In the rest of the paper we will study the problem with internal habits (cˆ(t) = c(t)) and
then we will compare our findings with those (presented in [4]) of the model with external
habits (cˆ(t) = c¯(t)).
2.1 The internal habit problem
The social planner problem consists in finding the strategy c (·) which maximizes the objec-
tive functional ∫ ∞
0
(
c(t)− ε
∫ t
t−τ
c(u)eη(u−t)du
)1−γ
1− γ
e−ρtdt (6)
under the state equation (which can be seen as an equality constraint)
k˙(t) = (A− δ) k(t)− c(t), t ≥ 0, (7)
the positivity constraints
k(t) ≥ 0, c(t) ≥ 0, (8)
the constraint
c(t) ≥ ε
∫ t
t−τ
c(u)eη(u−t)du, (9)
and with initial data k(0) = k0 > 0, c (s) = c0 (s) given for s ∈ [−τ, 0), where we assume
c0 (·) ∈ L1 ([−τ, 0);R+).5 Observe that we have already substituted in (6) and (9) the
equation describing the internal habit formations:
h(t) = ε
∫ t
t−τ
c(u)eη(u−t)du ∀t ≥ 0. (10)
whose initial value is known and is given by
h0 := ε
∫ 0
−τ
c0(u)e
η(u−t)du. (11)
In the following two sections we solve the social planner problem by using the dynamic
programming approach. Then, in Section 4, we prove our equivalence theorem showing that
the closed loop policy formula found in Section 3.2 is the same found in [4] for the market
equilibrium problem.
5L1
(
[−τ, 0);R+
)
indicates the space of functions from [−τ, 0) to R+ which are Lebesgue measurable and
integrable.
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3 Solution of the internal habit problem
3.1 Preliminary results
We first introduce a notation useful to rewrite more formally equation (10) and the objective
functional. We call c0(·) : [−τ, 0) → R+ the initial datum, c(·) : [0,∞) → R+ the control
strategy and c˜ : [−τ ,∞)→ R+ the function (sometimes called the concatenation of the two
above)
c˜ (s) =
{
c0 (s) for s ∈ [−τ, 0)
c (s) for s ∈ [0,∞)
With this notation equation (10) is rewritten more precisely as
h(t) = ε
∫ t
t−τ
c˜(u)eη(u−t)du ∀t ≥ 0. (12)
The state equation (7) is a standard linear Ordinary Differential Equation (ODE) and so it
can be easily seen that, for every locally integrable control strategy c (·) : R+ → R+6, there
exists a unique absolutely continuous solution of it, which will be denoted as kk0,c(·) (·) and
which is given by
k (t) = k0e
(A−δ)t −
∫ t
0
e(A−δ)(t−u)c(u)du. (13)
The objective functional to maximize is
J (k0, c0(·); c(·)) :=
∫ ∞
0
(
c(t)− ε
∫ 0
−τ c˜(u + t)e
ηudu
)1−γ
1− γ
e−ρtdt,
over the set
C (k0, c0(·)) =
{
c (·) ∈ L1loc
(
[0,+∞);R+
)
: kk0,c(·) (·) ≥ 0
and c(t) ≥ ε
∫ t
t−τ
c˜(u)eη(u−t)du ≥ 0 for almost every t ∈ R+
}
We call from now on (P) the problem of finding an optimal control strategy i.e. a strategy
c∗(·) ∈ C (k0, c0(·)) such that
−∞ < J (k0, c0(·); c
∗(·)) < +∞
and
J (k0, c0(·); c
∗(·)) = sup
c(·)∈C(k0,c0(·))
∫ ∞
0
(
c(t)− ε
∫ 0
−τ c˜(u + t)e
ηudu
)1−γ
1− γ
e−ρtdt
As usual we call value function the map
V (k0, c0(·)) := sup
c(·)∈C(k0,c0(·))
∫ ∞
0
(
c(t)− ε
∫ 0
−τ
c˜(u+ t)eηudu
)1−γ
1− γ
e−ρtdt
We now give a preliminary study of the problem concerning the behavior of admissible
trajectories and the finiteness of the value function.
First of all we give an estimate for the admissible control strategies and state trajectories.
6The space of such functions will be denoted from now on by L1
loc
([0,+∞);R+).
5
Proposition 1 (Lower bound for admissible strategies) We consider any initial da-
tum (k0, c0 (·)) ∈
(
R+ × L1 ([−τ, 0),R+)
)
and any control strategy c (·) ≥ 0 satisfying (9).
Then we have, for every t ≥ 0,
c(t) ≥ cm(t) (14)
where cm (·) ∈ L1loc([0,+∞);R
+) is the unique solution of the equation
cm (t) = ε
∫ t
t−τ
c˜m (u) eη(u−t)du (15)
Moreover the state trajectory k (·) associated to c(·) is dominated at any time t ≥ 0 by the
solution kM (·) obtained taking the same initial datum k0 and the control cm (·)
k(t) ≤ kM (t) = e(A−δ)t
[
k0 −
∫ t
0
cm (u) e−(A−δ)udu
]
. (16)
Proof. First we observe that, thanks to standard existence theorems for DDE’s (see e.g.
[32], Section 2.2) the equation (15) has a unique solution for every c0(·) ∈ L1([−τ, 0);R+).
Now take a control strategy c(·) ∈ C (k0, c0(·)). The constraint (9) together with (15) implies
that
c(t)− cm (t) ≥ ε
∫ t
t−τ
[c˜ (u)− c˜m (u)] eη(u−t)du, t ≥ 0
Clearly, since both functions c(·) and cm(·) have the same past c0(·), it must be c˜ (t)−c˜
m (t) =
0 for t ∈ [−τ, 0). So, calling c1(t) := c(t)− cm (t) we get, for t ∈ [0, τ ],
c1(t) ≥
∫ t
0
c1(u)e
η(u−t)du.
This implies, by a simple application of Gronwall inequality (see e.g. [32][p.15, Lemma 3.1],
that c1(t) ≥ 0 for t ∈ [0, τ ]. Take now t ∈ (τ , 2τ ]. As above we have, for any such t,
c1(t) ≥
∫ τ
t−τ
c1(u)e
η(u−t)du+
∫ t
τ
c1(u)e
η(u−t)du.
Since the function t→
∫ τ
t−τ c1(u)e
η(u−t)du is nonnegative for every t ∈ (τ , 2τ ], then applying
again the Gronwall inequality we get that c1(t) ≥ 0 for t ∈ (τ , 2τ ]. The claim (14) for every
t ≥ 0 then easily follows by induction. Finally the claim (16) follows by (14) and by the
formula (13).
The characteristic equation associated to the delay equation (15) writes
1 = ε
∫ 0
−τ
e(λ+η)udu (17)
Proposition 2 (Properties of characteristic roots) The characteristic equation (17)
admits a unique real root, λ0. We have λ0 < ε − η and all complex roots have a real
part smaller than λ0. Moreover,
• if 1− ε
∫ 0
−τ
eηudu < 0 then λ0 is the only root with positive real part;
• if 1− ε
∫ 0
−τ e
ηudu > 0 all the roots have negative real part.
• if 1− ε
∫ 0
−τ
eηudu = 0 then λ0 = 0 and the other roots have negative real part.
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Proof. We first study real roots. Consider the function
ϕ : R→ R, ϕ (λ) = 1− ε
∫ 0
−τ
e(λ+η)udu.
Since ϕ′(λ) = −ε
∫ 0
−τ
ue(λ+η)udu > 0, then ϕ is a strictly increasing function of λ. Moreover
lim
λ→−∞
ϕ (λ) = −∞, lim
λ→+∞
ϕ (λ) = 1
and
ϕ(0) = 1− ε
∫ 0
−τ
eηudu ≥ 1− ετ , ϕ(ε− η) = e−ετ > 0.
The above equation implies that there exists a unique real root of the equation ϕ(λ) = 0.
Such root belongs to (−∞, ε− η).
Moreover, all complex roots λ = p+ iq satisfy the system
1− ε
∫ 0
−τ
e(p+η)u cos(qu)du = 0
ε
∫ 0
−τ
e(p+η)u sin(qu)du = 0
From the first equation we get that
1 < ε
∫ 0
−τ
e(p+η)udu = 1− ϕ(p).
This implies that ϕ(p) < 0 which implies p < λ0.
Finally, let 1− ε
∫ 0
−τ
eηudu < 0 and consider the function
a (λ) := (λ+ η)ϕ (λ) .
It can be easily seen that a (λ) rewrites
a (λ) = λ+ η − ε
(
1− e−(λ+η)τ
)
and that all complex roots of the characteristic equation ϕ(λ) = 0 are also zeros of a(·). Let
us assume that there exists a complex root, λ = p+ iq with p ∈ (0, λ0). Then, we have
Re (a (λ)) = p+ η − ε+ εe−(p+η)τ cos (qτ ) < p+ η − ε+ εe−(p+η)τ = a(p) < 0
which contradict the fact that Re (a (λ)) > 0. The rest of the claim is immediate.
Now we have, as a consequence, the following result.
Proposition 3 (Existence of admissible paths)
(i) Fix an initial datum (k0, c0 (·)) ∈
(
R+ × L1 ([−τ , 0);R+)
)
. The set C (k0, c0(·)) is
nonempty if and only if the control cm (·) introduced in (15) is admissible, i.e. such
that kM (t) ≥ 0 for every t ≥ 0.
(ii) In particular, if λ0 ≥ A − δ then for any c0(·) ∈ L1 ([−τ, 0);R+), such that c0(t) > 0
on a set of positive Lebesgue measure we have C (k0, c0(·)) = ∅.
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Proof. The first statement is an immediate corollary of Proposition 1.
Concerning the second statement we observe first that the solution of the equation (15) can
be written with a series expansion (see e.g. Corollary 6.4, p.168 of [22]) as follows
c˜m(t) =
∞∑
r=0
pr(t)e
λrt (18)
where {λr}r∈N is the sequence of the roots of the characteristic equation (17) and the pr(t)
are polynomials of degree less or equal to m(r) − 1 where m(r) is the multiplicity of λr.
Now, using e.g. [10], Section 6.7 (in particular Theorem 6.5) we can explicitly compute the
coefficients of such solutions by using the Laplace transform.
In particular, since λ0 is a simple root, we have
p0 =
ψ(λ0)
ϕ′(λ0)
where
ϕ(λ) = 1− ε
∫ 0
−τ
e(λ+η)udu
and
ψ(λ) = (1 − ϕ(λ))
∫ 0
−τ
c0(u)e
−λudu
Clearly, if c0(·) > 0 on a set of positive Lebesgue measure we have that p0 > 0 and so the
leading term of the series (18) is p0e
λ0t and all the others are complex exponentials with
negative real part. So the corresponding state trajectory kM (·) is
kM (t) = e(A−δ)t
[
k0 −
∫ t
0
p0e
(λ0−(A−δ))udu+ ξ(t)
]
where ξ(·) : [0,+∞) → R is a bounded function coming from the lower order term of the
series (18). When λ0 6= A− δ it follows
kM (t) = e(A−δ)t
[
k0 +
p0
λ0 − (A− δ)
+ ξ(t)
]
−
p0
λ0 − (A− δ)
eλ0t
Clearly, when λ0 > A − δ the limit of the above expression is −∞, so the claim follows.
When λ0 6= A− δ we have
kM (t) = e(A−δ)t [k0 − p0t+ ξ(t)]
and again the limit of the above expression is −∞, so the claim follows.
Due to the above proposition it makes sense to study the social planner problem when
λ0 < A− δ. (19)
and the initial datum c0(·) is small enough so to guarantee that the corresponding kM (·) is
always strictly positive. It is clear that λ0 is the lowest possible growth rate of the habit:
this growth rate has to be lower than the real interest rate of the economy (r = A−δ), which
coincides with the maximum growth rate of capital obtainable from the capital accumulation
equation when consumption is set to zero. In fact an economy cannot sustain over time
a growth rate which exceeds the real interest rate because capital does not accumulate
sufficiently fast to sustain the higher and higher consumption.
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Note in particular that (19) is surely true if
ε− η ≤ A− δ. (20)
or, since εη (1− e
−ητ ) < 1⇔ λ0 < 0, if
ε
η
(1− e−ητ ) < 1 and A− δ > 0. (21)
From now on, we will focus on the case
λ0 < ε− η ≤ 0 < A− δ. (22)
The condition ε− η ≤ 0 is usually assumed in the economic literature (e.g. Constantinides
[20]) because it prevents the economy to asymptotically converge to the corner solution
c(t) = h(t).
We finally observe that strict positivity of kM (·) is guaranteed by assuming that, beyond
(19)
k0 >
∫ +∞
0
e−s(A−δ)cm(s)ds (23)
where cm(·) is the unique solution of (15). The economic intuition behind this restriction
on the initial condition of capital will be explained in Section 4.
Therefore conditions (19) and (23) are necessary to guarantee that the value function V is
not always −∞ at a given point. Here we give a sufficient condition for the finiteness of V .
Proposition 4 (Finiteness of the value function V ) Let us consider an initial datum
(k0, c0 (·)) ∈
(
R+ × L1 ([−τ, 0);R+)
)
. Assume that (19) and (23) hold true, so C (k0, c0(·)) 6=
∅. If
ρ > (A− δ) (1− γ) , (24)
then the value function is always finite.
Proof. To prove the claim it is enough to prove the following:
(i) If γ ∈ (0, 1) then there exists M+ > 0 such that, for all (k0, c0 (·)) in the space(
R+ × L1 ([−τ , 0),R+)
)
,
0 ≤ V (k0, c0) ≤M+k
1−γ
0 .
(ii) If γ ∈ (1,+∞) and (21) holds, then there exists M− < 0 such that, for all (k0, c0 (·))
in the space
(
R+ × L1 ([−τ, 0),R+)
)
,
M−k
1−γ
0 ≤ V (k0, c0) ≤ 0.
We prove first (i). The first inequality is obvious since for γ ∈ (0, 1) we always have
J (k0, c0(·); c(·)) ≥ 0.
Concerning the other inequality setting (Fleming and Soner [29], p.30-32, Freni et al. [30])
ζ (s) =
∫ s
0
c (u)1−γ du
9
and applying Ho¨lder’s inequality to ζ (s) =
∫ s
0 s
1−γ
(
c(u)
s
)1−γ
du yields to
ζ (s) ≤
(∫ s
0
s
1−γ
γ du
)γ (∫ s
0
(
c (u)
s
) 1−γ
1−γ
du
)1−γ
≤ sγ
(∫ s
0
c (u) du
)1−γ
as c (u) = (A− δ) k (u)− k˙ (u)∫ s
0
c (u) du =
∫ s
0
(A− δ) k (u)du− k (s) + k (0)
Now, according to equation (13), k (s) ≤ k (0) e(A−δ)s. Thus using also that k(s) ≥ 0 for
s ≥ 0 we get ∫ s
0
c (u) du ≤ k0e
(A−δ)s (25)
and so
ζ (s) ≤ sγk1−γ0 e
(1−γ)(A−δ)s
Now we have
J (k0, c0(·); c(·)) ≤
∫ +∞
0
c(s)1−γ
1− γ
e−ρsds
and, integrating by parts and using (25),
J (k0, c0(·); c(·)) ≤
(
k
1−γ
0
1− γ
∫ +∞
0
sγe((1−γ)(A−δ)−ρ)sds
)
which gives the claim.
Now we prove (ii). The second inequality is obvious since for γ ∈ (1,+∞) we always have
J (k0, c0(·); c(·)) ≤ 0.
Concerning the other inequality we observe that, calling cm(·) the unique solution of (15)
we have, thanks to (23) and (21) that, for α > 0 small enough, the control strategy defined
as c1(t) = c
m(t) + α (t ≥ 0) is admissible.
Indeed, calling k1(·) the associated state trajectory we have
k1(t) = e
(A−δ)t
[
k0 −
∫ t
0
e−s(A−δ)u(cm(u) + α)du
]
=
= e(A−δ)t
[
k0 −
∫ t
0
e−s(A−δ)ucm(u)du−
α
A− δ
]
This remain always positive if
α
A− δ
≤ k0 −
∫ +∞
0
e−s(A−δ)ucm(u)du
which is possible by (23). Moreover the control c1(·) satisfy the constraint (9) since, substi-
tuting it into (15) we get
α ≥ α
ε(1− e−ητ )
η
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which is always true for positive α thanks to (21).
Since c1(·) is admissible we have
V (k0, c0(·)) ≥ J(k0, c0(·); c1(·)) =
α1−γ
ρ(1 − γ)
Now it is clear from what said above that it must be α ≤ (A − δ)k0, so the claim follows
taking M− =
(A−δ)1−γ
ρ(1−γ) .
Observe that condition (24) is the same condition which guarantees bounded utility in a
standard AK model. Therefore habits formation does not affect this condition.
Condition (24) will be assumed from now on without repeating it.
3.2 The equivalent infinite dimensional problem
We now rewrite our problem as an optimal control problem for ODE’s in an infinite dimen-
sional space. Note that, differently from what has been done in the previous literature (see
e.g. [23]) here the state equation (7) is not a DDE so the past of the control does not appear
there. The past of the control strategy appears in the objective functional (6) and in the
constraint (9). For this reason the way we choose to rewrite our problem is different from
the one given in the previous literature.
We work in Hilbert space M2 = R× L2 ([−τ, 0) ;R), with the scalar product defined by
〈(x0, x1 (·)) , (y0, y1 (·))〉M2 = x0y0 +
∫ 0
−τ
x1 (s) y1 (s) ds
for every x = (x0, x1 (·)) and y = (y0, y1 (·)) in M2.
We first define, following e.g. [37], the structural state of the infinite dimensional system we
want to study.
Definition 5 (Structural state) Given an initial datum (k0, c0(·)) ∈ R×L1 ([−τ, 0) ;R),
and a control strategy c (·) ∈ L1loc ([0,+∞) ;R) we define the structural state of our controlled
dynamical system at time t ≥ 0 as the element of M2:
X(k0,c0(·)),c(·) (t) =
(
kk0,c(·) (t) , s 7→ ε
∫ s
−τ
c˜ (t+ u− s) eηudu
)
In the following we would write X(t) for X(k0,c0(·)),c(·)(t) when no confusion is possible. The
second component of X(t) is a function of s ∈ [−τ, 0) and we will usually write X1(t)[s]
when we mean its value at time t for given s ∈ [−τ , 0).
We now define the unbounded operator A on M2 by
D (A) =
{
(x0, x1 (·)) ∈M
2, x1 (·) ∈W
1,2 ([−τ , 0] ;R) , x1 (−τ ) = 0
}
Ax = ((A− δ)x0,−x
′
1(·))
Moreover we define the operators
B : R→M2, Bc = c (−1, s 7→ εeηs)
and
D : R× C([−τ , 0];R) ⊂M2 → R, Dx = x1 (0) .
Now we show that the structural state above satisfy a suitable ODE in the space M2.
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Theorem 6 Given any initial datum (k0, c0 (·)) ∈ R×L1 ([−τ, 0) ;R) and any control strat-
egy c (·) ∈ L1loc ([0,∞) ;R) the associated structural state is the unique solution of the equation
dX(t)
dt = AX (t) + Bc (t)
X (0) =
(
k0, s 7→ ε
∫ s
−τ
c0 (u− s) eηudu
)
.
(26)
Proof. The proof easily follows by the definition of the structural state and of the operators
A and B. Uniqueness of the solution is similar to Bensoussan et al. ([11], Theorem 5.1,
p.282).
Now we consider the ODE (26) with generic initial datum x ∈ M2 and call X(t;x, c(·))
(or simply X(t) when clear from the context) the unique solution of it for a given control
strategy c(·) ∈ L1loc([0,+∞);R+). We take (26) as state equation and write a control problem
equivalent to our problem (P).
The constraint c(t) ≥ ε
∫ t
t−τ c(u)e
η(u−t)du writes
c (t) ≥ X1 (t) [0] = DX(t)
So the set of admissible control strategies for a given initial datum in x ∈M2 is given by
Cad (x) =
{
c (·) ∈ L1loc ([0,∞) ;R) , such that X0(t) ≥ 0, c(t) ≥ 0, c (t) ≥ X1(t)[0] for all t
}
The functional to be maximized becomes
J0 (x ; c (·)) :=
∫ ∞
0
(c(t)−DX(t))1−γ
1− γ
e−ρtdt
The value function is defined as
V0 (x) := max
c∈Cad(q)
J0 (x ; c (·))
where we set V0 (x) = −∞ if Cad (x) is empty.
We now derive the adjoints of the operators A, B and D.
Lemma 7 The adjoint of A in M2 is the operator A∗ : D (A∗) ⊂M2 →M2 defined as
D (A∗) =
{
(y0, y1 (·)) ∈M2 : y1 (·) ∈W 1,2 ([−τ , 0] ;R) and y1(0) = 0
}
A∗ (y0, y1 (·)) =
(
(A− δ) y0, s 7→
dy1(s)
ds
)
Proof. Take x ∈ D(A) and y ∈M2. We have
〈Ax, y〉M2 = (A− δ)x0y0 −
∫ 0
−τ
x′1 (s) y1 (s) ds
= (A− δ)x0y0 − x1 (0) y1 (0) + x1 (−τ) y1 (−τ) +
∫ 0
−τ
x1 (s) y
′
1 (s) ds
It follows that the set of all y ∈ M2 such that x → 〈Ax, y〉M2 can be extended to a linear
continuous functional on M2 is given exactly by D(A∗). Then we have, for x ∈ D(A) and
y ∈ D(A∗),
〈Ax, y〉M2 = (A− δ)x0y0 +
∫ 0
−τ
x1 (s) y
′
1 (s) ds
and the claim follows.
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Lemma 8 The adjoint of B is
B∗ :M2 → R, B∗ (y0, y1 (.)) = −y0 + ε
∫ 0
−τ
eηsy1 (s) ds.
Moreover the adjoint of D is
D∗ : R→ R× [C([−τ , 0];R)]∗, D∗c = c (0, δ0)
where δ0 is the Dirac’s δ at the point t = 0.
Proof. We have
〈Bc, (y0, y1 (·))〉
M2
= c
(
−y0 + ε
∫ 0
−τ
eηsy1 (s) ds
)
.
Moreover
〈Dx, c〉
R
= cx1 (0) = c (0 · x0 + δ0x1)
and the claim follows.
3.3 The HJB equation and its explicit solution
The Current Value Hamiltonian HCV of our problem is a real valued function defined on
the set
E ⊂M2 ×M2 × R, E =
{
(x, p, c) ∈ D (A)×M2 × R
}
and is given by
HCV (x, p ; c) =
(c−Dx)1−γ
1− γ
+ 〈Ax, p〉M2 + 〈B
∗p, c〉
R
(27)
When γ > 1, HCV (x, p ; c) is not defined in the points such that c = x1 (0) . In such points,
since the utility is −∞, we set HCV (x, p ; c) = −∞. The maximum value of the Hamiltonian
is defined by H (x, p) = supc≥x1(0)HCV (x, p ; c). The HJB equation of the problem is then
ρv (x)−H (x,Dv (x)) = 0 (28)
where the unknown v “should” be the value function V0. We will use the following definition
of solution. Note that it is different from the one used in the papers [7, 23].
Definition 9 We say that a function v is a classical solution of the HJB equation (28) in
an open set Y ⊆M2 if it is differentiable at every x ∈ Y and if satisfies (28) in every point
of Y ∩D(A).
Now we find a solution of the HJB equation. First we compute the maximum value Hamil-
tonian in the following lemma, whose proof is immediate.
Lemma 10 Given any p ∈M2 such that B∗p < 0 and any x ∈ D (A), the function
HCV (x, p ; ·) : [x1 (0) ,∞)→ R
admits a unique maximum point
cmax = Dx + (−B∗p)−1/γ .
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So, in this case
H (x, p) = 〈Ax, p〉M2 +
γ
1− γ
(−B∗p)
γ−1
γ + 〈Dx,B∗p〉
R
.
If, on the other hand, B∗p ≥ 0, then
sup
c≥x1(0)
HCV (x, p ; c) = +∞.
We now define, for x ∈M2,
G (x) =
(
1− ε
∫ 0
−τ
e(A−δ+η)sds
)
x0 −
∫ 0
−τ
e(A−δ)sx1 (s) ds = 〈x, κ〉
where κ =
(
1− ε
∫ 0
−τ
e(A−δ+η)sds, s 7→ −e(A−δ)s
)
.
It is worth noting that κ0 > 0 when we assume (22) i.e. that A − δ > 0 ≥ ε − η. In fact
looking at κ0 as function of τ we see that its derivative with respects to τ is always negative.
Since it converges to A−δ+η−εA−δ+η > 0 when τ → +∞, it must be always positive.
We call X the open subset of M2 defined by
X = {x = (x0, x1 (·)) ∈M
2, G(x) > 0}.
Proposition 11 The function v (x) = ν (G (x))
1−γ
with
ν =
1
1− γ
(
ρ− (A− δ) (1− γ)
γ
)−γ
is differentiable at all x ∈ X and is a solution of the HJB equation in X .
Proof. Let v (x) = ν (G (x))
1−γ
for every x ∈M2.
Then
Dv (x) = (1− γ) νG (x)−γ κ
Since B∗κ = −1 we have
B∗Dv (x) = (1− γ) νG (x)−γ B∗κ = − (1− γ) νG (x)−γ
〈Dx,B∗Dv(x)〉
R
= −x1(0) (1− γ) νG (x)
−γ
Now for x ∈ D (A) we have
〈Ax,Dv (x)〉M2 = (1− γ) νG (x)
−γ 〈Ax, κ〉M2 .
Moreover by definition of A and κ we have (integrating by parts and using that x(−τ ) = 0
since x ∈ D (A))
〈Ax, κ〉M2 = (A− δ)
(
1− ε
∫ 0
−τ
e(A−δ+η)sds
)
x0 +
∫ 0
−τ
x′1 (s) e
(A−δ)sds
= (A− δ)
(
1− ε
∫ 0
−τ
e(A−δ+η)sds
)
x0 + x1 (0)− (A− δ)
∫ 0
−τ
x1 (s) e
(A−δ)sds
= (A− δ) 〈x, κ〉M2 + x1 (0) .
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It follows that
H(x,Dv(x)) = (1− γ) νG (x)−γ [〈Ax, κ〉M2 − x1(0)] +
γ
1− γ
[(1 − γ)ν]
γ−1
γ G(x)1−γ
= (A− δ) (1− γ) νG (x)1−γ +
γ
1− γ
[(1− γ)ν]
γ−1
γ G(x)1−γ =
= νG(x)1−γ
[
(A− δ)(1 − γ) + γ[(1− γ)ν]−
1
γ
]
We can now substitute all the above in the HJB equation getting
ρv (x) −H(x,Dv(x)) =
= νG (x)
1−γ
[
ρ− (A− δ)(1 − γ)− γ[(1− γ)ν]−
1
γ
]
and the claim follows by the definition of ν.
The optimal feedback policy associated to the above solution of the HJB equation (28) is
easily found by Lemma 10 and is
ϕ(x) = x1 (0) + αG (x) , for x ∈ X (29)
where α = ρ−(A−δ)(1−γ)γ . Observe that α > 0 thanks to assumption (24).
3.4 Closed loop policy
We need to determine a set of admissible initial data included in X such that the candidate
optimal feedback ϕ given in (29) is really optimal. For any x in this set we will have that
v(x) = V0(x).
We call C
(
M2
)
the set of continuous functions from M2 to R. As in Bambi et al. [7], we
give definitions concerning feedback strategies.
Definition 12 Given an initial condition q ∈ M2, we call ψ ∈ C
(
M2
)
a feedback strategy
related to q if the equation {
dX(t)
dt = AX (t) + B (ψ (X (t)))
X (0) = q
(30)
has a unique solution Xψ (t) in Π =
{
f ∈ C
(
[0,∞),M2
)
, dfdt ∈ L
2
loc
(
[0,∞), D (A)′
)}
. The
set of feedback strategies related to q is denoted FSq.
Definition 13 Given an initial condition q ∈ M2, and ψ ∈ FSq, we say that ψ is an
admissible strategy if the unique solution Xψ (t) of (30) satisfies ψ (Xψ (·)) ∈ Cad (q). We
denote AFSq the set of admissible feedback strategies related to q.
Definition 14 We say that ψ is an optimal feedback strategy related to q if
V (q) =
∫ ∞
0
(ψ (Xψ(t))−DXψ(t))
1−γ
1− γ
e−ρtdt
We denote OFSq the set of optimal feedback strategies related to q.
We first prove that our candidate is always in FSq.
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Lemma 15 For every q ∈M2, the map
ϕ :M2 → R, ϕ (x) = x1 (0) + αG (x) ,
is in FSq.
Proof. We have to prove that{
dX(t)
dt = AX (t) + B (ϕ (X (t)))
X (0) = q
(31)
has a unique solution in Π. We first consider the following functional equation in c˜ and k˜
c˜ (t) = ε
∫ 0
−τ
c˜ (t+ u) eηudu
+α
[(
1− ε
∫ 0
−τ
e(A−δ+η)sds
)
k˜ (t) +
∫ 0
−τ
e(A−δ)sε
∫ s
−τ
c˜ (t+ u− s) eηudu ds
]
˙˜
k (t) = (A− δ) k˜ (t)− c˜ (t)
c˜ (s) = c (s) for s ∈ [−τ , 0)
c (0) = ε
∫ 0
−τ
c˜ (u− s) eηudu
+α
[(
1− ε
∫ 0
−τ
e(A−δ+η)sds
)
k (0) +
∫ 0
−τ
e(A−δ)sε
∫ s
−τ
c (u− s) eηudu ds
]
> 0
k˜ (0) = k (0)
This system has a unique continuous solution
(
c˜, k˜
)
on [0,∞) (d’Albis et al., [2]). Denoting
x˜ =
(
k˜, γ˜ (t)
)
where γ˜ (t) [s] = ε
∫ s
−τ c˜ (t+ u− s) e
ηudu, then x˜ satisfies{
dx˜(t)
dt = Ax˜ (t) + Bc˜ (t)
x˜ (0) = (k0, γ˜ (0))
which has a unique solution using e.g. Bensoussan et al. ([11], Theorem 5.1, p.282). Notice
that c˜ (t) = ϕ (x˜ (t)).
In this way we have proved existence and uniqueness when the initial datum is of the form
(k0, γ˜ (0)). To get the result for every initial datum q ∈ M2 we need to set the equation in
the space D(A)′ and then show that the solution is indeed continuous with values in M2.
This can be done exactly as in [25], Section 5-6. We do not do it for brevity and also since,
to solve our starting problem (P) it is enough to deal with the narrower set of data used
here.
Now we want to prove the optimality of ϕ. This is very difficult to prove (and in general
not true) without additional assumptions. So we will prove the optimality of ϕ when (22)
holds and the initial datum q belongs to a given set I ⊂ X which includes the data we are
interested in. We start by proving a useful invariance property for the trajectory associated
to ϕ.
Proposition 16 For every initial datum q ∈M2 the solution Xϕ (·) of (31) satisfies
G (Xϕ (t)) = G (q) e
Γt
for all t ≥ 0
where Γ = 1γ (A− δ − ρ).
Proof. It is enough to compute ddtG (Xϕ (t)). Indeed we have
d
dt
G (Xϕ (t)) =
d
dt
〈Xϕ (t) , κ〉
= 〈AXϕ (t) + Bϕ (Xϕ (t)) , κ〉
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Now we cannot, as done in other papers (see e.g. [7, 23], write
〈AXϕ (t) , κ〉 = 〈Xϕ (t) ,A
∗κ〉
So we have to compute such term directly. Since
A (x0, x1 (·)) =
(
(A− δ)x0, s 7→ −
dx1 (s)
ds
)
and
κ =
(
1− ε
∫ 0
−τ
e(A−δ+η)sds, s 7→ −e(A−δ)s
)
,
then, integrating by parts as in the proof of Proposition 11,
〈AXϕ (t) , κ〉 = (A− δ)Xϕ,0(t)
(
1− ε
∫ 0
−τ
e(A−δ+η)sds
)
+
∫ 0
−τ
dXϕ,1(t)[s]
ds
e(A−δ)sds
= Xϕ,1(t)[0] + (A− δ) 〈Xϕ (t) , κ〉 = Xϕ,1(t)[0] + (A− δ)G(Xϕ (t))
Moreover, since Bc = c (−1, s 7→ εeηs), and
ϕ(Xϕ(t)) = Xϕ,1(t) [0] + αG (Xϕ (t))
then
〈Bϕ (Xϕ(t)) , κ〉 = 〈B (Xϕ,1(t) [0] + αG (Xϕ (t))) , κ〉 =
= (Xϕ,1(t) [0] + αG (Xϕ (t)))
(
−1 + ε
∫ 0
−τ
e(A−δ+η)sds− ε
∫ 0
−τ
e(A−δ+η)sds
)
= −Xϕ,1(t) [0]− αG (Xϕ (t))
Hence, summing up, we get
d
dt
G (Xϕ (t)) = (A− δ − α)G (Xϕ (t)) .
Using that
A− δ − α = Γ
the claim follows.
Now we define the set I and state a key invariance property of it.
Proposition 17 The set I defined as
I = X ∩
{
q = (x0, x1) ∈ R×W 1,2([−τ , 0];R) ⊂M2,
x1 (s) > 0 for all s ∈ [−τ , 0],
}
is invariant for the flow of the autonomous ODE
dX (t)
dt
= AX (t) + B (ϕ (X (t))) .
Hence, if (22) holds, then for any q ∈ I we have ϕ ∈ AFSq.
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Proof. Let q = (x0, x1(·)) ∈ I. We show that the associated solution Xϕ(t) of (31) still
belongs to I for every t > 0. Since we already know, by Proposition 16, that we always have
G(Xϕ(t)) > 0, it is enough to prove that, for every t > 0, Xϕ,1(t)[0] > 0 and Xϕ,1(t)[s] > 0
for almost all s ∈ [−τ, 0).
Let now t0 ≥ 0 be the supremum of all times t such that the above remain true. We show
the t0 = +∞. First of all observe that, by using the definition of structural state, we have,
for t ≥ 0 and s ∈ [−τ, 0],
Xϕ,1 (t) [s] =

x1(s− t) + εe
η(s−t)
∫ t
0 c¯ (u) e
ηudu, if t− s− τ < 0,
εeη(s−t)
∫ t
t−s−τ
c¯ (u) eηudu, if t− s− τ ≥ 0,
(32)
where
c¯ (u) = Xϕ,1(u) [0] + αG (Xϕ(u)) for 0 ≤ u < t.
Since G(Xϕ(t)) > 0 for every t ≥ 0, from the above is clear that, for small t > 0 and for
every s ∈ [−τ, 0] it must be Xϕ,1(u) [s] > 0. So it must be t0 > 0.
Now assume by contradiction the t0 is finite. The we have
c¯ (u) = Xϕ,1(u) [0] + αG (Xϕ(u)) > 0 for 0 ≤ u < t0.
So according to (32) it must be
Xϕ,1 (t0) [s] > 0
for every s ∈ [−τ, 0]. This give the contradiction showing the invariance of I since clearly
the W 1,2 regularity in s preserves due to (32).
Finally we observe that, if (22) holds, then Xϕ,0 (t) > 0 for all t ≥ 0. Indeed, since
G (Xϕ(t)) > 0 we must have(
1− ε
∫ 0
−τ
e(A−δ+η)sds
)
Xϕ,0 (t) >
∫ 0
−τ
e(A−δ)sXϕ,1(t)[s]ds ≥ 0.
Recalling that assumption (22) implies that 1 − ε
∫ 0
−τ
e(A−δ+η)sds > 0 (see the discussion
before Proposition 11) we immediately get Xϕ,0 (t0) > 0. Thus ϕ ∈ AFSp.
It now remains to prove that ϕ ∈ OFSp.
Proposition 18 If q ∈ I and (22) holds, then ϕ ∈ OFSq. The associated state-control
couple is the unique optimal couple of the problem.
Proof. Let us consider the solution of the HJB equation v (x) = ν (G (x))
1−γ
and the
function
v˜ (t, x) : R×M2 → R
v˜ (t, x) = e−ρtv (x)
Now take q ∈ I, take any admissible control c(·) ∈ Cad(q) and call X(·) the associated state
trajectory starting at q. Then we have
dv˜ (t,X (t))
dt
= −ρe−ρtv (X (t)) + e−ρt < Dv (X (t)) ,AX (t) + Bc(t) >
Observe that the above make sense since, by construction (see e.g. (32)) it must be X(t) ∈
D(A) when q ∈ I.
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Integrating on [0, τ ] yields to
e−ρτv (X (τ ))− v (X (0)) =
=
∫ τ
0
e−ρt [−ρv (X (t)) + < Dv (X (t)) ,AX (t) > + < B∗Dv (X (t)) , c (t) >] dt (33)
Now
G (X (t)) =
(
1− ε
∫ 0
−τ
e(A−δ+η)sds
)
X0 (t)−
∫ 0
−τ
e(A−δ)sX1(t)[s]ds.
Since, as noted before Proposition 11, we have 1 − ε
∫ 0
−τ
e(A−δ+η)sds > 0, then it must be
G (X (t)) ≤
(
1− ε
∫ 0
−τ
e(A−δ+η)sds
)
X0 (t), thus
e−ρτG (X (t))1−γ ≤
(
1− ε
∫ 0
−τ
e(A−δ+η)sds
)1−γ
e−(ρ−(1−γ)(A−δ))τ
(
X0 (t)
e(A−δ)t
)1−γ
According to Proposition 1 (since clearly X0(t) ≤ kM (t)) we thus have that
lim
τ→∞
e−ρτv (X (τ )) = 0.
Hence, using that q = X (0) and taking the limit as τ tends to infinite in (33), we obtain
−v (q) =
=
∫ +∞
0
e−ρt [−ρv (X (t))+ < Dv (X (t)) ,AX (t) > + < B∗Dv (X (t)) , c (t) >] dt (34)
so using the definition (27) of current value Hamiltonian
v (q)− J0 (q; c(·)) =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt (ρv (X (t))−HCV (X (t) , Dv (X (t)) , c(t))) dt
As the value function solves ρv (x)−H (x,Dv (x)) = 0, the above implies that
v (q)− J0 (q; c(·)) =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt [H (X (t) , Dv (X (t)))−HCV (X (t) , Dv (X (t)) , c(t))] dt
(35)
According to the definition of H, for every admissible control the integrand of the above
right hand side is always positive. This implies, according to the definition of V0, that
v (q) ≥ V0 (q)
and this must be true for every q ∈ I. Moreover, choosing c(t) = ϕ(Xϕ(t)) (which is
admissible thanks to Proposition 17) clearly the right hand side becomes zero and so such
control strategy is optimal. This implies that v (q) = V0 (q) for every q ∈ I.
Finally, if c1(·) is another optimal strategy (with associated state trajectory X1(·)) it must
satisfy (35) (where now v = V0 since they are equal on I). So it must be necessarily, for a.e
t ≥ 0,
H
(
X1 (t) , Dv
(
X1 (t)
))
−HCV
(
X1 (t) , Dv
(
X1 (t)
)
, c1(t)
)
= 0
which implies that, t a.e., c1(t) = ϕ(X1(t)). By the uniqueness of the solutions of the closed
loop equation (31) proved in Lemma 15, we then get that, t a.e., c1(t) = c(t).
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Remark 19 To get the explicit solution v of the HJB equation and to find the optimal
closed loop policy ϕ, we cannot apply directly the approach used in [23] or in [7] due to the
presence of the delay in the constraint and in the objective functional instead than in the
state equation. This changes the structure of the problem. In particular, differently from
the case treated in the previous papers, the gradient Dv of the solution of the HJB equation
does not belong to D(A∗) and so the concept of solution of such equation must be changed
(compare Definition 9 with the analogous one of such papers). This fact induces a change
in the arguments of the main proofs: the fact that v solves the HJB equation and the fact
that the feedback strategy ϕ is admissible and optimal.
It is worth noting that the optimality of ϕ depends on the initial datum q to belong to
the set I; this implicitly implies a restriction on the initial value of capital which we may
choose. This restriction will be made explicit in the next Section after Proposition 20 and
its economic meaning will be also explained.
4 Equivalence
The result of the previous section gives the optimal feedback map in the infinite dimensional
setting. We now use this result to write the closed loop policy formula in the delay differential
equation setting and we use it to prove the equivalence between the cases of internal and
external habits.
Proposition 20 Given any initial datum (k0, c0(·)) the problem (P) above has a unique
optimal state-control couple (k∗(·), c∗(·)). Such couple is the only one that satisfies the
closed-loop formula:
c (t)− h (t)
A− δ − Γ
=
=
(
1− ε
∫ 0
−τ
e(A−δ+η)sds
)
k (t)−
[
h (t)
A− δ + η
− εe−(A−δ+η)τ
∫ t
t−τ
e(A−δ)(t−s)
A− δ + η
c˜ (s) ds
]
where h(t) is given by (12).
Proof. We have, by the definition of the optimal feedback map ϕ, that, on the optimal
path,
c (t)− h (t) = αG (X(t))
= (A− δ − Γ)
[(
1− ε
∫ 0
−τ
e(A−δ+η)sds
)
X0(t)−
∫ 0
−τ
e(A−δ)sX1(t)[s]ds
]
Now we know that X0(t) = k(t) while X1(t)[s] = ε
∫ s
−τ
c˜(t + u − s)eηudu so, substituting,
we have,
c (t)− h (t)
A− δ − Γ
=
(
1− ε
∫ 0
−τ
e(A−δ+η)sds
)
k (t)− ε
∫ 0
−τ
e(A−δ)s
∫ s
−τ
c˜(t+ u− s)eηududs
Now we integrate by parts obtaining, with straightforward computations,∫ 0
−τ
e(A−δ)s
∫ s
−τ
c˜(t+ u− s)eηududs
=
1
A− δ + η
∫ 0
−τ
c (t+ v) eηvdv − e−(A−δ+η)τ
∫ t
t−τ
e(A−δ)(t−s)
A− δ + η
c (s) ds
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which gives the claim.
Using the above result it is not difficult to prove, by straightforward computations, that
given any initial data (k0, c0 (·)) , there exists a Λ such that, along an optimal trajectory,
the optimal control c (·)∗ satisfies
c(t)− h(t) = ΛeΓt
with
Λ = (A− δ − Γ) ·
·
((
1− ε
∫ 0
−τ
e(A−δ+η)sds
)
k (0)−
[
h (0)
A− δ + η
− εe−(A−δ+η)τ
∫ 0
−τ
e−(A−δ)s
A− δ + η
c (s) ds
])
.
(36)
It is worth noting that the constraint, c(t) ≥ h(t), is respected if Λ > 0 or equivalently, in
term of the initial capital stock, if
k(0) ≥
h(0)
A− δ + η − ε+ εe−(A−δ+η)τ
−
εe−(A−δ+η)τ
A− δ + η − ε+ εe−(A−δ+η)τ
∫ 0
−τ
e−(A−δ)uc (u)du.
In the specific case, τ = ∞ and ε = η this condition becomes rk(0) > h(0) meaning that
capital income (which in our context coincides with the initial wealth) has to be higher
than the initial habits otherwise an initial consumption higher than h(0) will pin down a
consumption path not sustainable over time since financed with the resources coming from
disinvestments.
In the case with a finite τ this condition becomes less restrictive as the first term in the
right hand side of the inequality becomes smaller and the second negative term appears.
The reason is that the stock of habits is now formed over a finite consumption history and
therefore less resources are needed at the beginning because the past consumption affecting
the habit formation will be completely “depreciated” after a period of length τ .
At this point we have all the information for proving the main result of the paper.
Theorem 21 (Equivalence Theorem) Consider an economy with subtractive nonsepa-
rable C.E.S. utility function and linear technology. Then internal and external habits lead
to the same unique equilibrium path. This path is Pareto optimal.
Proof. The closed loop policy formula for the external case was found in Augeraud-Veron
and Bambi [4] (see proof of Proposition 4) using a modified version of the Pontryagin Max-
imum Principle. Such function writes:
c(t)− h(t)
A− δ − Γ
= k(t)−
1
A− δ + η
[
h (t) + ε
(
1− e−(A−δ+η)τ
)
k (t)
−εe−ητe−(A−δ)τ
∫ t
t−τ
e−(A−δ)(u−t)c (u) du
]
(37)
Therefore the equivalence between external and internal habits emerges immediately com-
paring it with the result of Proposition 20. It is worth noting that the initial value of the
costate variable found in [4] is exactly equal to the constant Λ given in (36), as expected.
Therefore the market equilibrium path in the case of external habits has been proved to
be Pareto optimal since it coincides with the optimal path derived by solving the problem
with internal habits. Interestingly enough this result is robust to any selections of the key
parameters in the economy and even more importantly to any specification of the parameter
τ capturing the consumption history relevant in the formation of the habits.
21
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have shown that internal and external habits may lead to the same closed
loop policy function and then to the same Pareto optimal equilibrium path. Interestingly
enough this anomaly emerges when the utility function is subtractive nonseparable but not
for the multiplicative nonseparable case as emerged from Carroll et al. [19]. Therefore models
with habits formation and subtractive utility function needs a higher degree of heterogeneity,
as for example different initial endowments across the households, to guarantee a clear
distinction between the external and internal specification. Alternatively, the multiplicative
nonseparable formulation should be preferred and used.
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